Complete Home & Office Legal Guide/Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO/stat/ussct/delember.asc

Text File | 1993-09-14 | 53KB | 937 lines

/* Many lawyers and law students find this case to perhaps be the
"case of the year" within constitutional law. The case is over
the rather strange proposition that is it, or is it not,
unconstitutional to execute someone who is in fact innocent of
the capital crime for which they are to be executed. Read on for
the answer. */

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of
the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United States
v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HERRERA v. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 91-7328.  Argued October 7, 1992-Decided January 25, 1993

On the basis of proof which included two eyewitness
identifications, numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence, and
petitioner Herrera's handwritten letter impliedly admitting his
guilt, Herrera was convicted of the capital murder of Police
Officer Carrisalez and sentenced to death in January 1982.  After
pleading guilty, in July 1982, to the related capital murder of
Officer Rucker, Herrera unsuccessfully challenged the Carrisalez
conviction on direct appeal and in two collateral proceedings in
the Texas state courts, and in a federal habeas petition.  Ten
years after his conviction, he urged in a second federal habeas
proceeding that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that he
was "actually innocent" of the murders of Carrisalez and Rucker,
and that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee therefore forbid his execution. He supported this claim
with affidavits tending to show that his now-dead brother had
committed the murders.  The District Court, inter alia, granted
his request for a stay of execution so that he could present his
actual innocence claim and the supporting affidavits in state
court.  In vacating the stay, the Court of Appeals held that the
claim was not cognizable on federal habeas absent an accompanying
federal constitutional violation.

Held:  Herrera's claim of actual innocence does not entitle him
to federal habeas relief.  Pp. 6-28.

 (a) Herrera's constitutional claim for relief based upon
his newly discovered evidence of innocence must be evaluated in
light of the previous 10 years of proceedings in this case.  In
criminal cases, the trial is the paramount event for determining

the defendant's guilt or innocence.  Where, as here, a defendant
has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for
which he was charged, the constitutional presumption of innocence
disappears.  Federal habeas courts do not sit to correct errors
of fact, but to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution.  See, e.g., Moore v.  Dempsey, 261
U. S. 86, 87-88.  Thus, claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the course of the underlying state
criminal proceedings.  See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 317.
The rule that a petitioner subject to defenses of abusive or
successive use of the habeas writ may have his federal
constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a
proper showing of actual innocence, see, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U. S. ___, ___, is inapplicable in this case.  For Herrera
does not seek relief from a procedural error so that he may bring
an independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or
sentence, but rather argues that he is entitled to habeas relief
because new evidence shows that his conviction is factually
incorrect.  To allow a federal court to grant him typical habeas
relief-a conditional order releasing him unless the State elects
to retry him or vacating his death sentence-would in effect
require a new trial 10 years after the first trial, not because
of any constitutional violation at the first trial, but simply
because of a belief that in light of his new found evidence a
jury might find him not guilty at a second trial.  It is far from
clear that this would produce a more reliable determination of
guilt or innocence, since the passage of time only diminishes the
reliability of criminal adjudications.  Jackson v.  Virginia, 443
U. S. 307, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, and Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578, distinguished.  Pp. 6-15.

 (b) Herrera's contention that the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process guarantee supports his claim that his showing of
innocence entitles him to a new trial, or at least to a vacation
of his death sentence, is unpersuasive.  Because state
legislative judgments are entitled to substantial deference in
the criminal procedure area, criminal process will be found
lacking only where it offends some principle of justice so rooted
in tradition and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental.  See,
e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S.  197, 202. It cannot be
said that the refusal of Texas-which requires a new trial motion
based on newly discovered evidence to be made within 30 days of
imposition or suspension of sentence-to entertain Herrera's new
evidence eight years after his conviction transgresses a
principle of fundamental fairness, in light of the Constitution's
silence on the subject of new trials, the historical availability
of new trials based on newly discovered evidence, this Court's
amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to impose a
time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered
evidence, and the contemporary practice in the States, only nine
of which have no time limits for the filing of such motions.  Pp.
15-20.
    (c) Herrera is not left without a forum to raise his actual
innocence claim.  He may file a request for clemency under Texas
law, which contains specific guidelines for pardons on the ground
of innocence.  History shows that executive clemency is the
traditional "fail safe" remedy for claims of innocence based on
new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial
motion.  Pp. 20-26.

 (d) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that in a
capital case a truly persuasive post-trial demonstration of
"actual innocence" would render a defendant's execution
unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were
no state avenue open to process such a claim, Herrera's showing
of innocence falls far short of the threshold showing which would
have to be made in order to trigger relief.  That threshold would
necessarily be extraordinarily high because of the very
disruptive effect that entertaining such claims would have on the
need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place
on the States.  Although not without probative value, Herrera's
affidavits are insufficient to meet such a standard, since they
were obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and an
opportunity to make credibility determinations; consist, with one
exception, of hearsay; are likely to have been presented as a
means of delaying Herrera's sentence; were produced not at the
trial, but over eight years later and only after the death of the
alleged perpetrator, without a satisfactory explanation for the
delay or for why Herrera pleaded guilty to the Rucker murder;
contain inconsistencies, and therefore fail to provide a
convincing account of what took place on the night of the
murders; and do not overcome the strong proof of Herrera's guilt
that was presented at trial.  Pp. 26-28.  954 F. 2d 1029,
affirmed.

 Rehnquist, C. J., delivere